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Potential applications of neutrino detection to nuclear security have been discussed since the
1970s. Recent years have seen great progress in detector technologies based on inverse beta de-
cay, with the demonstration of ton-scale surface-level detectors capable of high quality neutrino
spectrum measurements. At the same time coherent elastic neutrino nucleus scattering has been
experimentally confirmed in 2017 with neutrinos from stopped pion decay and there is a number
of experiments aimed at seeing this reaction with reactor neutrinos. The large cross section and
threshold-less nature of this reaction make it plausible to consider it for applications to nuclear
security and here, we present a first direct comparison of the two reaction modes.
INTRODUCTION
Neutrinos were discovered by Cowan and Reines in
1956 [1] using neutrinos1 from a nuclear reactor and in-
verse beta decay (IBD). Nuclear reactors are very bright
neutrino sources with 1019 neutrinos released per second
for 100MW of thermal reactor power. The neutrinos
originate in the beta decays of neutron-rich fission frag-
ments and not in the fission process itself. As a conse-
quence, the neutrino spectrum and rate are sensitive to
the fissioning isotope via the different fission fragment
yields. In the 1970s, Mikaelyan [2] realized that this
sensitivity could be exploited to learn about the reac-
tor state by neutrino observations, giving rise to the field
of applied neutrino physics, for a recent review see [3].
One of the major challenges arises from the fact that
detectors for this application have to be able to work
at the Earth’s surface and be able to suppress the re-
sulting backgrounds sufficiently to extract a high-fidelity
signal. Detectors with the requisite characteristics have
been demonstrated only very recently in 2018 [4, 5], more
than 60 years after the initial detection of reactor neutri-
nos.
Coherent elastic neutrino nucleus scattering (CEvNS)
was postulated in 1974 [6] and experimentally confirmed
in 2017 by the COHERENT experiment [7] using neu-
trinos with 10s of MeV energy. The CEvNS reaction
is interesting for applications because the cross section
per unit detector mass can be two orders of magnitude
larger than for IBD, potentially allowing for detectors
in the kilogram range. This reaction is also threshold-
less, potentially providing access to safeguards-relevant
signatures of plutonium breeding [8]. The detection of
reactor neutrinos, which have a mean energy of 4MeV,
via CEvNS has not yet been demonstrated, but there are
several experiments aimed at this goal [9–14].
1 In this letter we deal exclusively with electron antineutrinos and
for brevity will refer to them simply as neutrinos.
Physicists in the Soviet Union in 1978 first proposed
the use of neutrinos for remote monitoring of nuclear re-
actors [2]. The typical mixture of isotopes undergoing fis-
sion in a reactor comprises 235U, 238U, 239Pu, and 241Pu.
The plutonium content is a result of breeding reactions,
which happen in all reactors fueled with natural or low-
enriched uranium and proceeds via neutron captures and
beta decays. Each of these isotopes also has well-defined
and unique neutrino emissions, and both the energy spec-
tra and the number of neutrinos are different [15, 16].
Plutonium-239 has the lowest average neutrino energy of
the four isotopes within the reactor and this characteris-
tic allows for the determination of the plutonium content
of the reactor. The number of neutrinos emitted for each
isotope is also different and the resulting differences in
IBD event rates are shown in Tab. I. By observing the
number of neutrinos emitted by reactors and the spectra
of those neutrinos, the composition of the reactor fuel
and the power level of the reactor can be determined.
As a result, one can deduce whether the reactor could
potentially be producing weapons-grade material, even
without access to records of the reactor history [17].
Analyses with individual reactors have demonstrated
that this method of safeguards would have provided
timely information as to the plutonium production in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during the North
Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, even given the limited ac-
cess inspectors were given to the reactor [17]. Studies
have also applied this method to IR-40, the Iranian heavy
water reactor at Arak, and demonstrated that a neutrino
detector can meet or exceed the verification goals set by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [18].
Potential applications are not limited to reactor power
monitoring and plutonium production monitoring but
could include detection of nuclear waste streams from
reprocessing and spent nuclear fuel [17, 19], as well as
long-distance detection, see also Ref. [3]. For the two ap-
plications considered here, IBD detectors in mass range
of tons are sufficient and detectors with requisite capa-
bilities have been experimentally demonstrated. At the
same time, the neutrino emission spectra for both re-
2actors and nuclear wastes have most of their emission
below the IBD threshold. In particular, the neutron cap-
ture pathway from uranium to plutonium at a reactor in-
cludes beta decays which produce neutrinos of less than
1.2MeV. By number, the flux of these “breeding” neu-
trinos exceeds the flux of fission fragment neutrinos in
that energy range significantly. Therefore, some applica-
tions would benefit significantly if a threshold-less reac-
tion could be exploited [8].
RATES & SPECTRA
In IBD an electron antineutrino scatters off a proton
and produces a neutron and positron
ν¯e + p→ n+ e
+ . (1)
Since the neutron is heavier than the proton this reaction
has a threshold energy, which for the proton at rest is
given by
Ethrν =
(MN +me+)
2
−M2p
2Mp
= 1.806MeV . (2)
Since me,mν ≪ mn,mp, the energy of the incoming
neutrino and positron energy have a one-to-one relation
Ee+ = Eν −E
thr
ν . The total cross section at zeroth order
can be expressed as
σ =
2pi
m5ef
Rτn
Eepe (3)
where τn is the measured neutron lifetime and f
R=1.7152
is the phase space factor [20]. The cross section for IBD
for reactor neutrinos is approximately 6× 10−43 cm2 per
fission. To compute the neutrino event rates and energy
spectra from IBD, we use the cross section from Ref. [20]
and antineutrino fluxes for 235U, 238U, 239Pu, and 241Pu
from a simple summation calculation based on the data
in Ref. [16]. The use of this summation calculation allows
us to extend the neutrino spectrum to energies below the
IBD threshold, which is needed for the CEvNS calcula-
tions. Note, that this summation fluxes, as is usual, devi-
ate by about 5% from the Huber-Mueller fluxes [15, 16];
however, the relative properties of the four fissile isotopes
are a robust feature [17].
We compute the neutrino yield for each isotope
through numerical integration. As a benchmark we chose
a 100 MWth reactor, 1 kg CH2 detector, 10m standoff
from the reactor core and a data taking period of one
year. CH2 is a proxy for an actual organic scintillator
but approximates the proton fraction of most scintilla-
tors. Note, that 100MWth is typical of plutonium pro-
duction reactors and thus is a relevant bench mark. The
results are shown in Tab. I, the number of neutrinos de-
tected with IBD from each isotope in a reactor differs
Isotope 239Pu 241Pu 235U 238U
Events 288 398 418 636
TABLE I. IBD event number per kg of CH2 per year at a
100MWth reactor and at a distance of 10m.
significantly. At approximately 300 events with our given
parameters, 239Pu produces the fewest neutrinos, at only
about two-thirds the rate of 238U. 239Pu also has the low-
est mean energy; 238U has the highest mean energy. With
observations of both the event number and the spectra
of the neutrinos emitted from a nuclear reactor, one can
deduce both the composition of the mixture within the
reactor and the power level of the reactor itself.
Coherent elastic neutrino-nucleus scattering (CEvNS)
was postulated soon after neutral currents were discov-
ered; it occurs between a neutrino of any flavor and a
target nucleus [6]
ν¯ +X → ν¯ +X ,
where the signature is the recoil of the target nucleus X .
The cross section is approximately given by
dσ
dT
(Eν) =
G2F
4pi
N2M
(
1−
MT
2E2ν
)
, (4)
where we have neglected any nuclear form factors; for
reactor neutrino energies this is an excellent approxima-
tion. N is the neutron number, M is the nuclear mass
and T the nuclear recoil energy. CEvNS holds promise
for low-energy neutrinos detection due to the N2 depen-
dence. Despite its high cross section, CEvNS evaded de-
tection for decades because of the difficulty in detecting
very low nuclear recoil energies. In 2017, the COHER-
ENT collaboration used a 14.6 kg CsI[Na] scintillator de-
tector to observe CEvNS for the first time from neutrinos
at the Spallation Neutron Source at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory [7]. The relation between the observable re-
coil energy T and neutrino energy Eν is not one-to-one
and is more similar to the case of Compton-scattering,
therefore the neutrino energy spectrum information is
less direct than in the IBD case.
For CEvNS we use the cross section in Eq. 4 and the
same reactor parameters and standoff as for IBD. The
relevant observable is the nuclear recoil energy T and for
a given neutrino energy there is a kinematic limit to what
the maximum recoil energy can be
Tmax =
Eν
1 + MN
2Eν
. (5)
Unlike IBD, CEvNS can occur on any target and thus
there is a wide range of potential detector materials. We
show results for a selection of commonly used target ma-
terials. The cross section peaks at low values of T and
therefore, the total event rate sensitively depends on the
3low-energy detection threshold for nuclear recoils, Tmin.
One common way to quote CEvNS cross sections is per
target nucleus but for practical application the actual
target mass is more critical. Table II shows the neu-
trino event number above a given nuclear recoil energy
threshold for various target materials that could serve in
detectors for CEvNS. Note, that we sum the contribu-
tions of each stable isotope of each element weighted by
its natural abundance.
Threshold [eV] C Ne Si Ar Ge Xe W
0 1255 2147 2958 5048 9526 19033 27406
10 1223 2058 2794 4669 8343 15270 20462
100 1023 1565 1954 2908 3913 4623 4350
1000 335 296 227 169 35 1 0
TABLE II. CEvNS event number per kg per year for fission
of 235U at a 100MWth reactor and at a distance of 10m as a
function of isotope and recoil energy threshold.
Table III shows the recoil energies at which a CEvNS
detector with the given isotope as a target will detect
the same number of neutrinos as an IBD detector of the
same mass. This is again using the parameters outlined
previously with respect to reactor power, observation
time, distance, and target mass for 235U. For example,
a germanium detector will detect fewer neutrinos than a
currently operating IBD detector if the CEvNS detector
is unable to observe recoil energies below the required
496 eV. Table III also demonstrates the linearity of the
threshold energy versus the mass number of the target.
Note that we are specifically quoting the nuclear recoil
energy, the electron-equivalent measured energy typically
is much lower due to quenching.
This allows us to make a first observation: almost every
potential target isotope we considered will detect fewer
neutrinos than a currently operating IBD detector if the
CEvNS detector is unable to observe recoil energies be-
low 1 keV. To put this in context, the original COHER-
ENT observation was achieved with a recoil threshold of
approximately 5 keV. It is important to point out that
what matters here is the nuclear recoil threshold where
a reactor CEvNS event can be identified at a reasonable
level of background and with good efficiency. Consider
for example the recent CONNIE result [21], where the
detector has a threshold of 64 eV, but only at around
200 eV the median efficiency is reached and once quench-
ing is taken into account, this corresponds to ∼ 1 keV
recoil threshold.
Isotope C Ne Si Ar Ge Xe W
Tmin [eV] 791 782 707 677 496 352 281
TABLE III. The recoil energy threshold at which IBD and the
CEvNS detection result in the same neutrino event number.
Unlike IBD, CEvNS does not have a one-to-one corre-
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FIG. 1. Shown is the nuclear recoil spectrum on germanium
in arbitrary units for neutrinos stemming from fission of 235U,
239Pu, 238U, and 241Pu, respectively.
spondence between the energy deposited in the detector
and the true neutrino energy. For applications, the po-
tential to track plutonium production is entirely due to
the different energy spectra of the different fissile iso-
topes. In Fig. 1 we show the recoil energy spectrum in
germanium for the usual fissile isotopes. The spectral dif-
ferences persist also in the recoil spectrum and are most
prominent in the 100-200eV region.
APPLICATION RELEVANCE
Research in IBD applications has come a long way since
the original proposal in 1978 and we take the results of
Ref. [22], which in turn is based on the performance of the
PROSPECT detector [4], as our benchmark in reference
to two scenarios relevant to nuclear security:
• Reactor power: How long does it take to observe a
transition from reactor on to off or vice versa? With
IBD, this can be achieved with 1–2 tons of active
detector mass over a period of hours to days.
• Plutonium production: How long does it take to
distinguish a new, plutonium-free, reactor core
from an old, plutonium-rich, core? With IBD, this
can be achieved with active detector masses of 10–
20 tons in a period of weeks to months for most
reactor types.
It is of note, that those previous result do include real
backgrounds as measured by PROSPECT and that real-
istic deployment scenarios have been considered.
CEvNS at reactors has not been yet observed and it
is clear that apart from achieving a low nuclear recoil
threshold, mitigation of backgrounds will be the main
challenge, see e.g. Ref. [11]. Apart from the signal to
background (S:B) ratio also the shape of the background
matters, especially for S : B < 1. In Fig. 2 we show
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FIG. 2. Shown are potential background models for the
CEvNS process.
the signal shape in comparison to a number of plausible
background shapes. In reality the background will be
a mix of shapes since several independent processes will
contribute. Clearly, a E−1 background is the most perni-
cious, yet seems to be similar to what many experiments
see at very low recoil thresholds, see Ref. [23] for a recent
compilation of low-energy backgrounds.
Having fixed the shape of our background model the
only remaining free parameters are S:B and the recoil en-
ergy threshold. We use the same analysis framework as
Ref. [22] and can now evaluate what the ratio of the mea-
surement precision for either reactor power or plutonium
content is for a fixed mass of IBD and CEvNS detectors.
The employed likelihood function is quadratic in the pa-
rameters of interest and hence all precision scales as the
inverse square of detector mass. Therefore, the inverse
square of the ratio of precision for a given measurement
expresses how many times smaller or larger a CEvNS de-
tector would need to be to match the capabilities of an
IBD detector; we call this quantity the mass advantage.
If we neglect backgrounds, we find that the mass advan-
tage becomes unity for about one half the recoil energy
threshold values listed in Tab. III.
This result applies for both power and plutonium con-
tent measurements. This arises from less pronounced
spectrum differences between fissile isotopes in CEvNS.
The reason this also affects the power measurements is
the degeneracy between reactor power and plutonium
content [17]. In the ideal background-free case the mass
advantage for xenon can reach 40 for plutonium-content
determination and up to 80 for power monitoring, albeit
at a recoil threshold of 5 eV. At the other end of atomic
masses, the mass advantage for silicon is 3–6 at best.
Taking into account background, we obtain the results
shown in Fig 3, which are computed for sodium, germa-
nium, and xenon for a plutonium content measurement.
For S:B=1, which is essentially what has been demon-
strated for IBD, we find that a mass advantage of unity
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FIG. 3. Shown is the ratio of detector mass between CEvNS
and IBD to achieve the same precision as the corresponding
IBD measurement of the reactor plutonium content, including
a 1/E background component with the indicated S:B ratio.
is reached for a recoil threshold of about 140–300eV. The
mass advantage climbs to a value of 8–12 for a 5 eV re-
coil threshold. Should the background be 5 times or more
larger than the signal, it becomes very difficult to obtain
any mass advantage.
SUMMARY
We have presented a first comparison of the event rates,
spectra and resulting reactor monitoring capabilities of
inverse beta decay and the recently confirmed CEvNS
process. We find that a nuanced picture arises when we
consider both the energy threshold for the detection of
nuclear recoil and the actual detector mass, instead of
the cross section per target nucleus. To achieve detected
event rates per unit detector mass on par with IBD, re-
coil thresholds of 300–800eV are necessary. The informa-
tion contained in the neutrino energy spectrum regard-
ing reactor plutonium content does persist in CEvNS,
albeit at a lower level due to the unknown energy car-
ried away by the outgoing neutrino. In a direct compari-
son of the resulting ability to measure reactor power and
the plutonium content, we find that CEvNS detectors
must achieve recoil energy thresholds as low as 200 eV
to be similar to IBD detectors. Taking into account
backgrounds, we find that CEvNS detectors at best of-
fer a mass advantage of one order of magnitude assuming
that eV-scale recoil thresholds are feasible and a signal to
background ratio of about 1 can be achieved. In our com-
parison we did not consider the deployed weight of the
entire detector system or the ability to run remotely with
no user intervention for extended periods of time, which,
for instance, might present a challenge for cryogenic de-
tectors. Based on those results, it appears to us that, for
the foreseeable future, the best use case for CEvNS is not
5to replace IBD detectors but to complement them, for in-
stance with the direct detection of neutrinos produced in
plutonium breeding [8].
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